The Flawed Logic of Contemporary Panpsychism
Written on
Chapter 1: Understanding Panpsychism
When many individuals first consider panpsychism, they often conflate it with idealism, which posits that consciousness is the fundamental reality and that everything exists within it. This viewpoint, frequently encountered in simplified versions of Eastern philosophies like Buddhism, suggests that while atoms and electrons exist, their reality is ultimately contained within consciousness, making conscious experience the sole genuine reality.
Recently, however, a resurgence of philosophical exploration into panpsychism has emerged, suggesting that consciousness is not primary but rather a fundamental quality of the material world. In this framework, even basic particles like atoms and electrons are thought to possess some degree of consciousness.
Philip Goff, a philosopher advocating this viewpoint, elaborates on his theories in the well-known book Galileo's Error. Goff’s approach to panpsychism is not rooted in religious or spiritual beliefs; rather, he aims to provide a philosophical alternative to the challenges posed by materialism and dualism. Nevertheless, I contend that Goff's arguments are fundamentally flawed.
Section 1.1: Critique of Goff’s Argument
In his book, Goff spends the first half discussing the inadequacies of materialism in explaining consciousness, a critique that many familiar with the topic would already recognize. It isn't until page 111 that he introduces his panpsychist perspective. His narrative begins with a personal "conversion" experience during his university years, portraying a moment where he reconciled his scientific understanding with his personal experiences in a bar.
While this anecdote may be compelling, it does not provide the philosophical rigor needed to support his claims. Despite previously labeling his theory as "meta-materialism," I still find it lacking. Goff’s reasoning is straightforward: consciousness is real; both dualism and materialism have their issues; thus, panpsychism must be the answer. He argues that consciousness provides insights into the intrinsic nature of matter, asserting that it is the essence of all things, not merely something contained within them.
Section 1.2: The Gaps in Goff's Logic
Goff's criticism of materialism resembles a "God of the gaps" argument. He posits that because we cannot fully explain the intrinsic nature of reality, we should assume that electrons possess consciousness. However, this overlooks the fundamental issue: since science operates under the assumption of existence, claiming electrons are conscious without a clear framework for understanding what that means is problematic.
Moreover, Goff's definition of consciousness is vague. He describes consciousness as being experienced through sensory perceptions, yet fails to clarify what it means for an electron to have consciousness. If consciousness requires awareness of something, how can we assert that an electron possesses consciousness if it lacks the ability to experience?
Subsection 1.2.1: The Problem of Combination
Goff acknowledges a significant challenge within his theory known as the "combination problem," which questions how the individual consciousness of atoms amalgamates to create the complex consciousness experienced by humans and animals. His superficial treatment of this issue suggests that it pales in comparison to the difficulties faced by materialism, which I find unconvincing.
He implies that the panpsychist has a simpler task at hand by merely needing to address the gap between smaller and larger consciousnesses, yet does not adequately define what consciousness is when ascribed to electrons. This lack of clarity renders his argument circular and unsatisfactory.
Chapter 2: Exploring Split-Brain Experiments
Goff references split-brain studies to argue that consciousness can be segmented within the brain, suggesting that this supports his panpsychism. However, he misinterprets these findings. Even if there is evidence for distinct conscious experiences within split-brain patients, this does not imply that consciousness can be found in basic particles such as electrons.
Ultimately, Goff's reliance on speculative theories, such as quantum entanglement, fails to substantiate his claims. His conclusion that panpsychism resolves the issue of consciousness lacks the necessary philosophical grounding.
In summary, Goff’s panpsychism does not offer a comprehensive or adequate explanation for consciousness. It merely shifts the discussion without providing clarity on the fundamental questions of human experience, identity, and the nature of consciousness itself. The result is that his assertions remain as enigmatic as before, leaving many of the critical issues unresolved.